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Unprecedented attention has been focused recently on the broad
issue of corporate accountability and the responsibilities of the
audit committee in relation to it. The purpose, composition and
functions of audit committees have been major concerns of the
1970s.
As we enter the 1980s, we expect more attention to be directed
to the effectiveness of audit committees in their expanding role.
Their interaction with groups and forces, from within and outside
their organization, will influence the degree of accountability imposed as well as the credibility of the private sector.
This booklet presents developments, principally those in 1980,
which help define or predict the role of audit committees in the
corporate community. We discuss possible future directions and
present a review of certain related technical developments of
interest to audit committee members.
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I. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY

Introduction
Public attitudes have combined with governmental pressures to cause an evolution in the duties, responsibilities
and structure of boards of directors and audit committees.
Legislation, such as the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, litigation, accounting and auditing developments, and SEC
disclosure requirements are some of the external pressures
which have made audit committees and their duties a topic
of frequent discussion.
The process of establishing and structuring boards and
audit committees is an evolutionary one. As A. A. Sommer,
Jr., a former SEC commissioner, stated in the July 1980
issue of the Journal of Accountancy. "It is likely that current
trends toward more outside directors; auditing, nominating
and compensation committees dominated by outsiders;
adoption of codes of conduct; and other corporate reforms
will continue and that increasing numbers of corporations
will see fit to establish these mechanisms."
It is an accepted fact that audit committees in particular
have increased in number and importance. In fact, the
recent Conference Board report. Corporate Directorship
Practices: The Audit Committee, indicates that management generally desires strong audit committees. According
to the report, with a strong committee, management may
experience a feeling of added assurance regarding the effectiveness of internal accounting controls and the reliability of financial statements. This favorable reaction results
from responsible committees working together with
management to achieve mutual goals.
During the last several years attention has been focused on
the purpose, composition and functions of audit committees. This has resulted primarily from private sector initiatives assisted by encouragement from government regulators. Widely discussed has been the belief that audit committees help to balance the relationship between independent auditors and management and, therefore, help to
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ensure the auditors' independence. Regardless of the reasons for their formation, audit committees have become a
part of the corporate structure in a substantial number of
public companies. As we enter the 1980s, we expect the
focus of attention to move to the effectiveness of audit
committees.
Audit Committees and the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act
The passage of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA)
has had a significant effect on audit committees. The Act's
provisions imply a need for an internal control environment
which promotes efficient and adequate information for
management and directors and discourages improprieties.
This is accomplished through a system of internal accounting control and effective recordkeeping. In their oversight
role, audit committees have had to deal more actively with
the question of accountability in the information system.
The complexity of the FCPA and of most affected organizations has led to much confusion for corporate managers
and directors. This confusion results from a lack of understanding of internal control operations and limitations, as
well as confusion as to application of the Act itself. These
uncertainties may result in increased reliance by audit committees on their independent auditors, internal auditors and
counsel.
In response to many of the questions raised by the FCPA,
the Financial Executives Research Foundation commissioned a study of U.S. internal control practices entitled Internal Control in U.S. Corporations: The State of the Art.
The research was headed by Professor Robert K. Mautz of
the University of Michigan. This study found that most executives see control as a "key management responsibility
which they accept," but many resent the perceived implications that" U.S. corporate executives are not adequately attentive to control practices." Although the FCPA has encouraged a variety of actions by corporations, the report
states that control measures in use differ significantly. One
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conclusion of the study is that "the FCPA has a strong
tendency to encourage formal, often at the expense of informal, control measures."
A discussion of this subject is available in our firm's publication Internal Accounting Control—Current Developments
and Implications of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.
Proposed Amendment to the FCPA
A bill was introduced in Congress in 1980 which was intended to amend and clarify the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act of 1977. If reintroduced in the next Congress, and if
passed in its original form, it would, among other things:
• Change the title of the Act to Business Practices and
Records
• Designate the Justice Department as the principal enforcer of the FCPA
• Establish a materiality standard for the accounting standards section of the FCPA
• Clarify compliance with accounting provisions
In proposing the legislation, Senator John Chafee noted
that the unpredictable nature of the interpretation and enforcement of the FCPA by government agencies has
caused unnecessary confusion.
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II. THE EVOLVING ROLE OF AUDIT COMMITTEES

Requiring Audit Committees—Recent Developments
Public opinion and regulatory influence have had a significant impact on acceptance of audit committees by companies and boards. Our publication Audit Committees—A
Director's Guide includes a summary of the background of
audit committee requirements. Here we present an update
of recent events.
SEC Staff Report—Rulemaking Not Now Necessary.
The SEC's 1980 Staff Report on Corporate Accountability
is a compilation of data gathered over the last three years
and contains staff recommendations on a number of significant issues. The report stated: "While the staff does not believe that an audit committee rule is necessary at the present time due to the significant percentage of companies
that have established such committees, it will return to the
Commission with further recommendations if the trend in
establishment of such committees does not continue or if it
appears that further guidance with respect to the functions
of audit committees is necessary."
While not requiring audit committees, the SEC continues to
attempt to influence their formation, independence and
conduct by proxy rules requiring disclosure of whether
audit committees have been appointed, their composition,
functions and number of meetings. The SEC is considering
including similar requirements in their proposed registration
forms, and have asked for comments concerning this issue.
American Stock Exchange Issues Recommendations.
The A M E X adopted a policy recommending that all companies listed on the exchange establish audit committees
composed entirely of independent directors. However, it
did not mandate the establishment of an audit committee
as a requirement for listing because it was against interfering with the internal affairs of corporations.
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U.S. Congress—Bill Introduced Requiring Audit
Committees. A bill introduced in 1980 by Senator Howard
M. Metzenbaum, the Protection of Shareholders' Rights
Act of 1980, would have required certain large companies
to have audit committees composed solely of outside directors. The bill also specified the functions of audit
committees.
SEC Chairman Williams has stated his desire to have the independence and effectiveness of corporate boards
strengthened, but he raised several objections to the Metzenbaum bill during testimony before the Senate securities
subcommittee. He is concerned that more attention would
focus on compliance with the statute than on achieving effective boards. He stated that, "What we need, in my judgment, is to enhance private sector sensitivity to emerging
public concerns and values, and allow it the flexibility to respond accordingly."
The future of this legislation was uncertain at the end of
1980.
Court Actions. Some settlements of legal action have required establishment of totally independent audit committees. For example, a recent U.S. District Court decision required the following:
• Management must conduct internal audits, with internal
auditors reporting directly to the audit committee
• The audit committee must be composed of at least three
outside directors, who have no business dealings with
the firm other than directors' fees and expense reimbursement. The committee was authorized to:
o Retain or dismiss independent and internal auditors
o Consult with the independent auditors on their quarterly reviews of financials
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o Review all monthly corporate and division financial
statements and the auditor's management letter
o Receive quarterly reports from independent auditors
on internal control deficiencies
o Review and approve all reports to shareholders and
the SEC before dissemination
Although these activities do not necessarily reflect functions that normally would be performed by audit committees, this decision demonstrates the importance courts
may attribute to audit committees. It is an example in
which an audit committee was directly involved with the
court's imposed remedial action.
Who Serves on Audit Committees?
The objective of committee member independence has
been strongly supported by most commentators and independence is required by the New York Stock Exchange. Fulfilling this objective has caused a supply and demand
"crunch". John E. Lohnes reported in Directorship (November 1980) that "the result of these trends has been a steadily growing demand for independent outside directors, the
most desirable of whom are the chief executive officers of
other companies. But in ever increasing numbers, CEOs are
declining to make themselves available," Mr. Lohnes provides the following list of categories as being prominent in
filling empty board seats: lower ranking senior officers of
other companies; college presidents, administrators and
others from academic life; specialists; retirees; women and
minority group members.
In general, the Conference Board report shows that persons
with accounting or financial background are present on
committees but do not predominate. Therefore, the
changes taking place in financial accounting and regulatory
matters have necessitated getting more help, particularly
from accounting firms and inside or outside counsel. Given
proper assistance, the report states, "perhaps more valuable
than knowledge or experience . . . are a director's personal
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qualities... the audit committee has come to symbolize the
increasing emphasis on independence ... the essence of
that independence is the integrity—and sometimes the
courage—of the individual committee member."
The Conference Board report indicated that although there
are arguments in favor of systematic rotation of membership, it is not a majority practice. Also, few committees
customarily rotate their chairmen. An emphasis on retaining
experienced members seems to prevail.
What Activities Are Gaining Acceptance?
Much has been written and said regarding the traditional
committee activities. These are generally described as: involvement in auditor evaluation and in the process of selection; review of the audit plan and scope; review of audit results; and making appropriate inquiries of, or communications with, auditors and others. These appear to be commonly performed, in varying detail and format, in a majority
of committees—but the search for the "ideal" composition
of duties will continue.
Certain specific activities appear to be gaining additional
acceptance, primarily as the result of the corporate accountability issue and the apparent compatibility of these
duties with traditional committee functions. These include:
more involvement in the financial reporting process; concern with the total scope of services performed by the auditor and with auditors' fees; more involvement in the attention given internal accounting controls; increased involvement with internal auditors; and overseeing corporate
ethics.
More Involvement in the Financial Reporting Process.
Audit committee review of annual financial statements is a
common practice. We have found that some audit committes are also performing reviews of quarterly financial information, including press releases and quarterly reports to
the SEC, separate from the full board of directors.
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The Conference Board report predicts that some involvement with quarterly or other unaudited statements "may
become a preoccupation of more audit committees in the
future. One reason is concern ... that interim statements...
might be interpreted by an investor or by the SEC as misleading or inaccurate."
Recent SEC rule changes are intended to promote director
involvement in the reporting process. The changes include
a requirement that a majority of the board of directors, the
principal executive officer, the principal financial officer,
and the principal accounting officer or controller, sign the
Form 10-K. While we have some concern about a regulatory philosophy that seeks to achieve substantive conduct
on the part of directors through a signature requirement
we support the underlying objective of motivating directors,
particularly audit committee members, to become more involved with the annual report as well as the review of audit
results. What is now important for boards and audit committees is to plan for the necessary interaction between
directors, management, outside auditors and counsel.
Independent Auditors—Scope of Services and Fees.
The SEC's proxy monitoring data discussed in their staff
report indicates that for all companies examined, "over 58
percent of audit committees approve each professional service" provided by the auditor and over 42 percent "consider
the range of audit and non-audit fees." These percentages
may be lower than expected because the proxy information
examined included a period before the SEC proxy disclosure
rules were in their present form. Companies now must disclose the nature of non-audit services provided by the independent auditor and must state whether the board of directors or audit committee had approved each service in advance and considered its possible effect on independence.
We expect significant increases in these percentages.
The Conference Board report indicates that in 3.1 percent of
the statements of audit committee functions which were
analyzed, audit committees have been given some responsibilities in determining fees to be paid to the outside auditing
firm. In addition, the survey indicates that as a result of the
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disclosure requirements, many more companies plan to require their boards to pre-approve non-audit services. For
most of these companies this process will involve the audit
committee.
Emphasis on Internal Accounting Controls. The FCPA
has caused committees to place increased emphasis on the
effectiveness of internal accounting controls. The SEC
proxy monitoring data shows that the audit committees of
a "significant majority" of companies are now involved in
overseeing internal accounting controls. This may cause
committees to request more help and information from
their independent auditor, counsel (regarding FCPA compliance), and the internal audit department. The FCPA and internal controls are discussed further in Section I
of this booklet.
Dialogue with Internal Audit Departments. Internal auditors are becoming regularly involved in discussions with
audit committees, sometimes making formal presentations
or meeting separately with the committee. A formal dialogue is developing. In their 1977 publication Corporate
Audit Committees—Policies and Practices, Mautz and
Newman stated that "one of the surest marks of a maturing
committee is increased attention to the internal audit function." With their added responsibilities, audit committees
need this help and expertise—particularly for overseeing internal accounting controls, and in meeting the challenges
of the FCPA. Audit committees may find that objective and
competent internal auditors can provide a range of services
that is considerably broader than would be possible for independent auditors to provide at a reasonable cost.
According to the Conference Board report, almost 80 percent of the committee charters examined now "make internal auditing one of the assigned areas of oversight or responsibility." Certain of these duties deal with reviewing
and evaluating the internal audit function. The Institute of
Internal Auditors has published standards that recommend
external reviews of internal audit departments, similar to
the peer reviews undertaken by public accounting firms.

13

The scope of the review should be based on the level of sophistication of the internal audit function. A limited approach would be to have the following evaluated: qualifications of staff; training; quality control; staffing plans; and
the internal audit department's position in the organizational structure.
A comprehensive discussion of this subject is included in a
report prepared by Alan S. Glazer and Henry R. Jaenicke for
the Institute of Internal Auditors entitled A Framework for
Evaluating an Internal Audit Function. The report presents
a method for planning the evaluation and reporting the
results.
Because of their experience with their own profession's
peer review process, independent auditors are prepared to
provide guidance for establishing review procedures; or
they can conduct a review themselves and report the results of the evaluation to management and the audit committee or the full board of directors.
Overseeing Corporate Ethics Codes. The audit committee
is sometimes involved with corporate ethics. The term
"corporate ethics" is used here to describe the legality of
corporate actions and their propriety in terms of a corporate
"code of conduct."
The growth of written codes of conduct and passage of the
FCPA are both direct results of numerous disclosures of
sensitive corporate payments. According to a survey appearing in the Summer 1980 issue of Directors and Boards.
and conducted by the Opinion Research Corporation for
the Ethics Resource Center," as of 1979 as many as 50 percent of corporate codes of conduct were less than five
years old." In fact, 73 percent of the corporations surveyed
reported having written codes of ethics, most of which
"consist of general principles rather than specific rules."
Almost all existing codes are updated periodically.
These codes deal with many topics including political contributions, conflicts of interest, payments to government
officials or suppliers, receipt of payments, entertainment,
gifts and many others.

14

The Conference Board report found that a "newer area of
oversight is monitoring compliance with the corporate policies to prevent or control significant conflicts of interest on
the part of executives or other employees." Audit committee involvement in this process implies a broader responsibility than is traditional and may involve receiving assistance from internal auditors, attorneys or others.
Internal auditors have sometimes been involved in conducting special investigations for audit committees. Forty percent of the companies responding to a 1978 Conference
Board report on internal auditing said that their internal
audit staff had been involved in special auditing or information gathering initiated by the audit committee.
The audit committee of a large corporation was recently involved in overseeing a special investigation conducted by
outside counsel and independent auditors. Management
brought to the attention of the audit committee the possibility of questionable payment arrangements between
some operating units and certain of their suppliers. The
audit committee retained both outside counsel and auditors
to conduct the investigation. This particular investigation
was conducted totally independent of management, with
audit committee oversight, and with those performing the
investigation reporting directly to the audit committee.
Other Emerging Responsibilities. In addition to activities
discussed previously, certain others are being encouraged
by commentators and sometimes adopted by audit committees. These may be totally new, or they may be only more
detailed or intensified applications of responsibilities already assigned.
The Conference Board survey found that some audit committees have been empowered to "approve or decide upon"
the scope of an audit and to "make the decisions in situations that involve a choice of accounting principles." Some
commentators have suggested that audit committees
should have more involvement in all aspects of the audit
process, accounting and reporting matters, internal audit
administration and matters involving business conduct.
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It is our position that some suggestions imply responsibilities which should not be considered within the appropriate
review and oversight role of audit committees. Only in extreme or unusual situations should a committee be directly
involved in activities which are within the province of
management's, or another group's, responsibilities.
Some observers believe that there are many negative aspects to an ever-expanding role for audit committees. How
much, they ask, can an audit committee actually accomplish if they are spread so thin? How can a small group of
individuals be expected to comprehend and apply such a
large body of knowledge requiring accounting, legal and
operational expertise?
We agree that society must not expect more from audit
committees than can reasonably be accomplished. We
must continue to guard against dilution of the primary
audit committee function, which is oversight. A clear distinction between management and oversight must be
retained. Credibility of audit committees is important but it
can be maintained only if their role is realistically defined.
The Future
We believe that there are some clear signs for the future.
The 1980s have begun by electing a new President and essentially a new Congress. The philosophies of the new
members, and of the reelected incumbents as well, seem to
reflect a shift in the nation's mood toward conservatism
and productivity, and away from big government and regulation as the sources of solutions to our economic problems.
This bodes well for a business sector burdened by overregulation and faced with major challenges to its strength
and viability.
Some observers suggest or predict revision of the FCPA;
others see a reduced emphasis on corporate governance.
While these changes may occur, we do not believe they
will result in any reduction of the importance of audit com-
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mittees or their responsibilities. The validity of the role and
activities of audit committees has been proven and they
make good business sense. Tremendous strides have been
made in recognition of the audit committees' key role in
corporate governance.
Audit committees should expect continued scrutiny of
their activities, but with more focus on effectiveness rather
than compliance with a rigid set of rules. Success in meeting this challenge will be measured by further increases in
public and governmental confidence in, and reliance upon,
initiatives taken by the private sector toward more effective
accountability.
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APPENDIX A

TECHNICAL DEVELOPMENTS-ACCOUNTING AND
REPORTING
Financial Accounting Standards Board
The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), and its
predecessor, the Accounting Principles Board (APB), have
been responsible for formulating accounting standards in
the private sector. Although the SEC has the statutory authority to establish accounting standards, it has traditionally
looked to the private sector to respond to this need.
Recent FASB Statements. If detailed information on the
FASB is desired, the various statements of Financial Accounting Standards and related information on the FASB's
activities and agenda are discussed in our firm's regularly
updated booklet Financial Accounting Standards BoardSummary of Activities. Following is a listing of recently
issued FASB statements:
No. 44—Accounting for Intangible Assets of Motor Carriers
(an amendment of Chapter 5 of Accounting Research Bulletin No. 43, Intangibles Assets, and an
interpretation of APB Opinions No. 17, Intangible
Assets and No. 30, Reporting the Results of
Operations)
No. A3 —Accounting

for Compensated

Absences

No. 42 — Determining Materiality for Capitalization of Interest Cost (an amendment of FASB Statement No.
34)
No. 41 — Financial Reporting and Changing Prices: Specialized Assets—Income-Producing
Real Estate (a
supplement to FASB Statement No. 33)
No. 40—Financial Reporting and Changing Prices: Specialized Assets— Timberlands and Growing Timber (a
supplement to FASB Statement No. 33)
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No. 39 — Financial Reporting and Changing Prices: Specialized Assets—Mining and Oil and Gas (a supplement to FASB Statement No. 33)
No. 38—Accounting for Preacquisition Contingencies of
Purchased Enterprises (an amendment of APB
Opinion No. 16, Business Combinations)
No. 37 — Balance Sheet Classification of Deferred Income
Taxes (an amendment of APB Opinion No. 11, Accounting for Income Taxes)
No. 36 — Disclosure of Pension Information (an amendment
of APB Opinion No. 8, Accounting for the Cost of
Pension Plans)
No. 35 — Accounting and Reporting by Defined Benefit
Pension Plans
No. 34— Capitalization of Interest Cost
No. 33 — Financial Reporting and Changing Prices
Following is a discussion of two of the above topics which
are perhaps of the most general interest.
Disclosure of Pension Information. The FASB decided
that the lack of comparable disclosures in employers' financial statements about the financial status of their pension
plans required the amendment of existing disclosure standards as an interim measure pending completion of a project on accounting by employers for pensions. Certain of the
disclosures now required by FASB Statement No. 36, Disclosure of Pension Information, are generally the same as
prior requirements. However, for defined benefit pension
plans, additional disclosures are to be determined in accordance with Statement No. 35, Accounting and Reporting
by Defined Benefit Pension Plans. These disclosures include the actuarial present value of accumulated plan
benefits and the pension plan assets available for those
benefits.
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We expect significant future developments on this subject
as the FASB completes its project on accounting for
employer's cost of pension plans and other postemployment benefits with characteristics similar to pensions. In addition, the SEC staff has taken an active interest
in pension disclosures and has indicated that it will be carefully reviewing this year's disclosures. Chairman Williams
recently stated: "If the disclosures are not adequate, the
staff may recommend that the Commission consider implementing additional requirements until such time as the
FASB is able to complete its project..."
Financial Reporting and Changing Prices. FASB Statement No. 33, Financial Reporting and Changing Prices, requires that certain large publicly held companies disclose
certain supplementary information concerning the impact
of changing prices. Because of the lack of consensus and
general uncertainties as to a satisfactory solution to accounting for inflation, this Statement is a cautious and experimental approach to this issue. The FASB has been more
flexible than is customary, apparently to encourage experimentation that would help develop techniques for accumulating, reporting and analyzing data on the effects of
price changes. The Statement requires two different sets of
disclosures—one for current cost information (reflecting
specific price changes) and another for constant-dollar information (reflecting general inflation).
Those desiring more information will find this statement
discussed and explained further in our firm's publication
Financial Reporting and Changing Prices.
Future FASB Initiatives
Conceptual Framework Project. The Conceptual Framework Project is a major undertaking by the FASB which is
intended to lead to consistent financial accounting and
reporting standards. As Oscar S. Gellein, a retired senior
partner of our firm and former member of the FASB, recently stated, "the credence given financial reporting will deter-
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mine whether the private sector's role in standard setting
will grow or shrink. An operable conceptual framework will
go a long way in providing the necessary level of credibility.
Without an operable conceptual framework, continuation
of standard setting in the private sector would stand in considerable jeopardy."
Some of the specific benefits expected from the framework
are: guidance for the FASB in standard setting; provision of
a frame of reference for resolving questions if no standard
exists; determination of bounds for judgment in preparing
financial statements; an increase in financial statement
users' understanding and confidence; and enhancement of
comparability of financial statements.
In conjunction with the framework project, the FASB has
issued the first four of a series of Statements of Financial
Accounting Concepts. Statements in the series are intended to set forth objectives and fundamentals that will be
the basis for development of financial accounting and
reporting standards.
Clear progress on this project will do much to strengthen
the FASB's position as the leader in establishing and
improving accounting standards.
Foreign Currency Translation Proposal. In 1980 the FASB
issued an exposure draft of a proposed statement which
would supersede Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 8, Accounting for the Translation of Foreign Currency Transactions and Foreign Currency Financial Statements. This proposed statement, which would be effective
for fiscal years beginning on or after December 15, 1981
(with earlier application encouraged), was in response to
widespread objections to FASB Statement No. 8. These objections included: undue emphasis placed on exchange
rate fluctuations by reporting exchange gains and losses
and translation adjustments in current income; inconsistency between reported foreign currency exposure and
concurrent economic exposure; failure to recognize exten-
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sive economic hedges of foreign exchange risk exposure;
and distortion of normal relationships within the financial
statements of a foreign subsidiary or division.
The proposed statement attempts to overcome these objections by drastic changes including: use of the current rate
translation method in most situations; accumulation of foreign currency translation adjustments in a separate section
of shareholders' equity; reporting, with certain exceptions,
gains and losses from foreign exchange transactions in current income; and reduction of the effect of exposed net
monetary liability positions by broadening the criteria used
for determining hedges.
Our firm's response to the FASB, dated December 1, 1980,
included several major conclusions. Our primary conclusion
was that modifications needed to overcome the major objections to FASB Statement No. 8 could more logically and
easily be made by amending that Statement than by adopting a proposal that would be inconsistent with present U.S.
generally accepted accounting principles. W e suggested
that the FASB postpone any final action on the exposure
draft to permit analysis of the potential effects of applying
its provisions. We also offered observations as to areas
where changes would be needed if the FASB should issue a
final statement having the thrust of the exposure draft.
For those desiring more information on this subject, a more
comprehensive discussion and explanation of the proposed
statement is available in our firm's publication Foreign Currency Translation.
Auditing Standards Board-Proposed Revision of the
Independent Auditor's Standard Report
The AICPA Auditing Standards Board has proposed to
change the wording of the standard report on audited financial statements. The intent of the proposed change is to
more clearly indicate the nature of the audit process and
the degree of the auditor's responsibilities. The revised
wording incorporates concepts that currently exist in au-
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thoritative accounting and auditing literature but are only
implied in the current form of the report. In addition, the
intent is to remove certain terms that the Board believed
were unnecessary or ambiguous, without changing the
auditor's responsibilities or the basis for forming an opinion.
Our firm opposes the revisions to the report because,
among other things:
• We are not persuaded that an explanation of the audit
process, and its inherent limitations, is necessary or even
feasible on any meaningful basis.
• Reference to generally accepted accounting principles
without including the term "fairly" (which the Board proposes to delete), cannot convey that there are limits to
the precision that is reasonable and practicable to obtain
in financial statements; nor can it convey that the accounting principles selected are appropriate in the
circumstances.
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APPENDIX B

TECHNICAL DEVELOPMENTS—SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION
Integrated Disclosure System Adopted
The SEC's integrated disclosure efforts are an attempt to
standardize and simplify reporting requirements under the
Securities Acts. The integrated disclosure system is premised on the belief that investors expect to be furnished
the same basic information package—audited financial
statements, a summary of selected financial data and a
meaningful description of an enterprise's business and
financial condition —both to support current information requirements of an active trading market and to provide information with the sale of newly issued securities. The SEC's
initiative is intended to:
• Improve disclosure to investors and other users of financial information
• Achieve a single disclosure system at reduced cost
• Reduce current impediments to combining shareholder
communications with official SEC filings
The SEC did not adopt its proposal for mandatory incorporation by reference into the Form 10-K of the basic information package in the annual report to shareholders. Instead,
it adopted an optional approach, expecting that the design
of the new integrated disclosure system would encourage
both incorporation by reference and the combination of the
annual report and Form 10-K into one document. The SEC
views the annual report to shareholders as the most effective means of shareholder communication and the adopted
changes are not intended to affect the format, readability or
quality of existing shareholder reports. The principal thrust
of the changes was to standardize disclosure items in
annual reports to shareholders to make them consistent
with similar requirements in SEC filings.
Those desiring a more comprehensive discussion of this
subject can refer to our firm's publication The SEC's Integrated Disclosure System.
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Reaction to Justice Department FCPA Reviews
The Justice Department which is responsible for criminal
enforcement of the FCPA, established a FCPA review procedure permitting companies to obtain guidance concerning
the applicability to a certain transaction of the FCPA's bribery prohibitions. The SEC, which is responsible for civil enforcement of the FCPA, chose not to participate in the program. However, to encourage companies to use the Justice
Department's review procedure, the SEC has decided it will
not commence a civil enforcement action alleging violations of the FCPA in any case where a company receives a
clearance letter from the Justice Department prior to May 31,
1981. The SEC has stated it will reevaluate its position in
1981.
The Role of Corporate Lawyers—
Proposed Rules Rejected
The SEC recently rejected proposed rules to require disclosure of the relationship between corporations and their attorneys. One of the primary reasons given for the rejection
was that "companies are experimenting with a variety of
ways for information to flow to the board of directors."
The SEC also rejected rule proposals which would have required lawyers (inside counsel or outside) to report directly
to the board of directors, or through the audit committee,
any questionable corporate activities involving a law enforced by the SEC, or any other law, if the violation could
result in material financial liability or call into question the
quality or integrity of management.
While these proposals have been rejected, the SEC has continued to urge an expanded role for corporate lawyers and
inside counsel.
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Reporting on Internal Accounting Control—
Proposal Withdrawn
In May 1980 the SEC withdrew a proposed rule which
would have required registrants to include a statement by
management on internal accounting control in reports to
shareholders and in Form 10-K filings. The proposal would
also have required auditors to examine and report on the
statement.
Chairman Williams said the SEC would look instead to the
corporate community and the accounting profession to develop management reporting and auditor review techniques. The efforts of the Financial Executives Institute and
the AICPA were cited by the SEC as having promoted the
increased number of voluntary management reports in
1979, providing one reason for the withdrawal.
Another important factor in the SEC's decision was the
pending development by the AlCPA's Auditing Standards
Board of Statement on Auditing Standards No. 30, Reporting on Internal Accounting Control. The Statement describes procedures for an auditor to apply in connection
with examining internal controls and the forms of reports to
be issued in connection with the examination. This guideline will be used by auditors when companies voluntarily
engage them to evaluate and report on their internal
controls.
The SEC plans to continue monitoring voluntary private
sector developments and to reevaluate their position in
1982. Chairman Williams recently stated: "The Commission
continues to believe that management disclosure concerning its system of internal accounting control has considerable value. The value is, however, partially dependent on
meaningful auditor involvement
I anticipate a substantial increase in both the quantity and quality of such information in 1980."
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The message is clear. The SEC expects public companies to
present management reports in their financial statements.
And they expect some form of auditor involvement with
those reports, if such involvement is cost justified.
Although audit committees may find independent auditors'
reports on internal accounting controls to be useful, they
should realize that such reports have several limitations. For
example, such reports do not assure compliance with the
FCPA. One reason is that the independent auditor studies,
evaluates, and reports only with respect to material items
even in an overall evaluation of the system. The Act contains no materiality standard. Also, compliance with the
Act is a legal determination that independent auditors are
not qualified to make. Finally, the Act goes beyond internal
accounting controls by including a requirement for accurate books and records, and it includes anti-bribery
provisions.
Management and audit committees should give this subject
careful consideration during the next year. They should
consider the form of management's expression of their assessment of the system of internal accounting control. In
addition, they should consider the extent of the independent auditor's involvement and whether the auditor should
also report publicly on their evaluation of the system.
Future Initiatives
Review of Disclosure Rules. In addition to monitoring the
effectiveness of the recently adopted integrated disclosure
system, the SEC will continue to consider other appropriate
modifications. The purpose of the continuing project is to
reduce unnecessarily burdensome or complex rules. Items
requiring further study include:
• What disclosures, if any, beyond those required by generally accepted accounting principles have significance to
users of the information, and in what format should they
be presented
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• The significance and utility of parent company financial
statements and separate financial statements of unconsolidated subsidiaries and "50 percent or less owned
persons"
Proposed Registration Forms and Amendments to
Quarterly Report Form 10-Q. Included in the SEC's adoption of the integrated disclosure concept were the following
major rule change proposals:
• New registration statement forms which would constitute
the basic disclosure document format for most 1933
Securities Act registrations. It would establish different
levels of disclosure requirements for different classes of
enterprises. Included among the specific issues on which
the SEC has requested comment is whether there should
be audit committee disclosure information required by
these forms.
• Amendments to Form 10-Q which are intended to make
interim period and annual disclosure requirements more
consistent and to encourage the integration of Form
10-Q reports with quarterly reports furnished to
shareholders.
More Attention to Management's Discussion and
Analysis. As a result of the recent reorganization of the
SEC's Division of Corporation Finance along industry lines,
the SEC believes they can "better ascertain the disclosure
needs of different industries and more readily identify industry trends." We understand that the SEC staff will be
seeking more consistent application of its disclosure rules,
particularly by giving closer scrutiny to the management
discussion and analysis section of filings. This will require
emphasis on developing an analysis that will provide informative insight into the reported financial results of a
company.
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Proposed Federal Securities Code Supported. The SEC
recently announced its support for enactment of a proposed
Federal Securities Code. The draft code endorsed by the
Commission was completed over a period of ten years
under an American Law Institute project. The code seeks to
draw together the seven separate federal securities statutes
currently in effect into a single comprehensive law—updated to address the issues and problems arising over the past
four decades.
The next step is for the draft code to be introduced in Congress, possibly in 1981. However, enactment is not expected in the near future.
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